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As widely recognized, human mankind stands before the most challenging problem of preventing 
anthropogenic climate change. As a response to this, the European Union advocates an ambitious climate 
policy mix. However, there is no consensus concerning the impact of stringent environmental policy on 
firms’ competitiveness and profitability. From the traditional ‘static’ point of view there are productivity 
losses to be expected. On the other hand, the so called Porter hypothesis suggests the opposite; i.e., due to 
‘dynamic’ effects, ambitious climate and energy policies within the EU could actually be beneficial to firms 
in terms of enhanced profitability and competitiveness. Based on Sweden’s manufacturing industry, our 
main purpose is to specifically assess the impact of the CO2 tax scheme of Sweden on firms’ profit 
efficiency. The empirical methodology is based on stochastic frontier estimations and, in general, the 
results suggest we can neither reject nor confirm the Porter hypothesis across industry sectors. Therefore, 
we do not generally confirm the argument of stringent environmental policies having positive dynamic 
effects that potentially offset costs related to environmental policy. 
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According to the traditional economic view, investors are exemplars of “homo 
economicus,” an antisocial species interacting with others only for the benefits of gaining 
valuable information. Thus, investors in stock markets should not be influenced by others 
unless it is rational to be so. In contrast, homo sapiens (a species which we are certain stock 
investors belong to) are frequently influenced by other humans. This social influence may be 
beneficial in improving judgments and decisions. However, sometimes social influence 
occurs when it is not beneficial. 
 
Current research on herding in stock markets is primarily conducted by economists. 
Although references are occasionally made to social-psychological research (e.g. Asch, 1952; 
1956), the aim of the research is primarily to show that herding actually exists, and if it exists, 
that it is rational and thus possible to reconcile with rational choice theory (efficient market 
theory) in economics (e.g. Bikhchandani & Sharma, 2000; Devenow & Welch, 1996). The 
aim of the present paper is to propose that various types of social influence are underlying 
herding in stock markets and that some of these types follow the regularities social-
psychological theories of social influence attempt to explain. In the next section we briefly 
describe anomalies in stock markets. A discussion of different types of social influence in 
stock markets follows. We then review the research on herding. A final section presents our 
conclusions and charts directions for future research. 
 
Anomalies in Stock Markets 
In stock markets investors trade stock shares. Why do they trade? A rational analysis 
suggests that investors only trade if they differ from each other, for instance in liquidity 
needs, risk perception or attitude, or knowledge (Glaser, Nött, & Weber, 2004). These 
differences are however not sufficient to explain the observed high trading volumes (Odean, 
1999). A reason may be that stock prices are too low or too high. According to efficient 
market theory (EMT) proposed in financial economics (Fama, 1970), if the trading prices of 
stocks deviate from their fundamental value due to “noise” traders, it will increase trading by 
rational investors whose trading eventually will correct the prices. However, empirical 
observations questioning the validity of EMT indicate that rational investors’ ability is limited 
in nullifying the impact of noise traders (DeBondt, 2008; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Possible 
reasons are lack of mispriced, fully substitutable stocks to purchase, uncertainty about 
fundamental stock values, and, as a consequence, uncertainty about whether price trends will 
continue. Rational investors may for this reason even follow noise traders in buying 
“glamour” stocks with increasing price trends, thereby reinforcing rather than counteracting 
the price trends. 
 
Anomalies (deviations from EMT) are causes of booms that become bubbles and eventually, 
in uncontrolled ways, lead to busts or crashes. It is estimated that 13 stock market crashes 
occurred between 1800 and 1940 including the ”Great Crash” of 1929 (Galbraith, 1955/1997). 
In many people´s vivid memory is the unprecedented bull market 1982-1987 when nobody 
anticipated what in 1987 became a crash, or the dot.com boom/bubble ending with a crash in 
1999. Explanations of stock market crashes tend to focus on the crash itself. However, what 
needs to be explained is why a boom that is sensible given economic upswings becomes a 
bubble (Rapp, 2009). Many observers (Akerlof & Shiller, 2008; Krugman, 2009) ascribe an 
important role to psychological factors. In Gärling et al. (2010) several anomalies are 
identified, including overreaction to news (Andreasson, 1990; Schachter, Hood, Andreasson, 
& Gerin, 1986), the disposition effect (Shefrin & Statman, 1985), reactions to splits of stock 
shares (Svedsäter, Gamble, & Gärling, 2007),  and naïve risk diversification (Hedeström, 
Svedsäter, & Gärling, 2006). Other anomalies have also been noted (e.g. DeBondt, 2008).  
Explanations have primarily included well-known cognitive biases such as overconfidence, 
conservatism, optimism bias, money illusion, asymmetric risk attitudes, framing, loss 
aversion, biased information search, mental accounting, diversification heuristic, and co-
variation neglect (Koehler & Harvey, 2007). Some of the cognitive biases are furthermore 
exaggerated by affective influences on investors (Zaleskiewicz, 2008). 
 
Cognitive biases, whether exaggerated by affective influences or not, are probably necessary 
but not sufficient explanations of why booms in stock markets become bubbles. In Figure 1 
we highlight additional, and presumably substantial, effects of social factors. Individual 
investors who judge financial risks and make decisions to buy and sell stocks are guided by 
societal, organizational and personal values. As has been shown in previous research 
(Fontaine, Poortinga, Delbeke, & Schwartz, 2008; Schwartz, 1992), value priorities range 
from self-interest (self-enhancement) to collective interest (self-transcendence). In general 
self-interest is likely to be a dominant guiding principle although sometimes overriden by 
fairness (Fehr & Schmitt, 1999; Rabin, 1993). Investors who are employed by financial 
institutions are largely influenced by their employers’ value priorities, even though these 
differ from their personal value priorities (Nilsson, von Borgstede, & Biel, 2004). As 
exemplified by research on socially responsible investments (SRI, Jansson & Biel, 2010), 
societal value priorities emphasizing long-term sustainability are particularly difficult to 
implement in a financial industry so much influenced by short-term profits. A decision to 
incorporate SRI in fund management does not seem to be guided by environmental and social 
values. Rather, the decisive factor is a positive attitude towards SRI, supported by beliefs 
about positive short-term returns. 
 
An important question to be analyzed further in the next sections is the extent to which and 
how different types of social influence play roles in the investment process. Clearly, there are 
both informal and formal ways. Internal agencies, in particular trustees and top and middle 
management, are responsible for defining the organizational culture or informal aspects of the 
decision making structure. To the extent that values are widely shared among members of an 
organization, an organizational culture may exist that in turn form the basis for expectations 
about proper norms and behaviour (O’Reilly, Chatman, & Caldwell, 1991). As mentioned 
above, in the case of SRI informal aspects do not guide the investment process. Formal 
aspects are also set by external decision making agencies such as consultants, rating agencies, 
index providers, and regulators. In the domain of SRI, sustainability ratings currently 
available are better suited to single out worst-performers than to identify best-performers 
(Hedesström, Lundqvist, & Biel, in press). Moreover, ratings have been shown to vary 
considerably across analyst organizations. Granted that uncertainty prevails concerning 
positive sustainable investment opportunities, investors may interpret the behaviour of others 
as an indicator of suitable investment alternatives. 
 
Types of Social Influence in Stock Markets 
If some investors in stock markets start to buy stocks in a given company or industry 
sector, other investors may follow them and buy the same stocks  a phenomenon referred to 
as herding. Sias (2004) accordingly defines herding as investors’ tendency to follow each 
other in buying and selling the same stocks. He further notes that herding exists both for 
individual and institutional investors. Still, observations of market behavior do not permit 
strong inferences about the causes of herding. Although social influence is the common 
denominator, several types of social influence are conceivable as will be discussed below with 
reference to Figure 2.   
Although implied by the definition that herding is equivalent to imitating others, social 
influence by others may also be indirect. Four main causes of indirect social influences have 
been proposed in previous research: common knowledge, fads, common investment 
strategies, and similar compensation schemes. Common knowledge has an influence when 
investors, independently of each other, use the same information (Froot, Scharfstein, & Stein, 
1992; Grinblatt, Titman, & Wermers, 1995). Evidence of fads is that investors buy the same 
popular stocks (Sias, 2004). Many investors may also systematically follow the same 
investment strategy (Wermers, 2000). To this should be added that cognitive biases are the 
same for many investors, thus would have the same influence as following the same 
investment strategy has. Investment firms’ schemes for compensating their employed 
investors frequently reward performance relative to that of others, and therefore the investors 
may earn less if deviating from a market index (Rajan, 1994).  
 
Herding due to direct influences from other investors is believed to arise from “information 
cascades” where investors, independently of their private information, use the observations of 
choices made by others preceding them to make the same choice (Bikchandani, Hirshleifer, & 
Welch, 1992), or “reputational herding” referring to that choices that deviate from others’ 
choices impose costs for investors in terms of an impaired reputation (Scharfstein & Stein, 
1990). The possible causes of herding are not mutually exclusive. Thus, investors may herd 
for several reasons at the same time. 
 
Review of Research on Herding in Stock Markets 
The issues addressed by research are whether herding exists, whether herding is rational or 
irrational, and what causes herding. On the first issue no definite consensus have been reached 
in research based on analyses of investor behavior in stock markets (see review by Hirshleifer 
& Teoh, 2003). While some studies confirm the existence of herding (e.g., Guedj & 
Bouchaud, 2005; Sias, 2004), others do not (e.g., Drehmann, Oechssler, & Roider, 2005; 
Grinblatt et al. 1995; Lakonishok, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1992; Wermers, 1999). The different 
results are partly explained by how herding has been measured. One common measure 
developed by Lakonishok et al. (1992) assumes that large imbalances between the number of 
buyers and sellers in stocks are evidence of herding. Studies applying this measure (Grinblatt 
et al. 1995; Wermers, 1999) show a lower level of herding compared to studies applying other 
measures (Bennett, Sias, & Starks, 2003; Nofsinger & Sias, 1999). 
 
Experiments (e.g., Anderson & Holt, 1997; Celen & Kariv, 2004) show more clearly that 
information that others’ actions provide is utilized. Whether this is rational or not is debated. 
One argument for rationality is that others’ actions convey useful information, either because 
the others have more knowledge or simply because they are members of a crowd. The 
“wisdom of the crowd” (Surowiecki, 2004) refers to the statistical fact that under conditions 
of independent random sampling, an aggregate collective judgment is more accurate than 
individual judgments. An empirical illustration is an experiment by Treynor (1987) in which 
participants made independent judgments of the number of jelly beans in a jar. The jar had 
850 jelly beans. The aggregate group estimate was 871, and only one of the 56 participants 
made a better judgment. Thus, as would be expected, a combined judgment by a group 
outperforms the average individual (Larrick & Soll, 2006). In order to characterize a crowd as 
“wise,” each person in the crowd must possess unbiased independent information and each 
judgment must be made independently. If the individual judgments are aggregated by giving 
each equal weight, then unsystematic errors will cancel. In a similar vein, independent 
unbiased judgments by investors would yield stock prices close to their fundamental values. It 
is also important to realize that accuracy of aggregated judgments will increase with group  
size (although at a decelerating rate). Imagine that only three people participated in the jelly-
bean experiment. Adding a fourth would obviously have a large influence on the aggregated 
judgment. In contrast, the judgment by another participant would have little influence on the 
aggregated judgment by an already large group. 
 
Information cascades start in stock markets when investors ignore their private information 
and imitate others (Smith & Sørensen, 2000). An everyday illustration of an information 
cascade is given by Shilller (2000). Imagine that a person chooses between two unfamiliar, 
apparently similar restaurants situated on each side of a street. The person has received mixed 
reviews by others about one of the restaurants (A) and good reviews about the other (B). 
When approaching the restaurants, the person notes that restaurant A is more crowded than 
restaurant B. For this reason he or she ignores the private information about the reviews and 
choose the same restaurants as the others.  
 
In a typical experiment investigating information cascades (e. g. Anderson & Holt, 1997), 
participants’ task is to predict which of two events (A or B) would take place. On each trial 
participants receive a cue (a or b) followed by the events A and B with a predetermined 
probability. The cue is private but the prediction is publicly announced, thus participants on 
each trial receive information about the private cue and the decisions made by the preceding 
participants. An information cascade occurs when a participant observes two consecutive 
choices (A, A) and, despite contrary private information (b), chooses the same option as the 
others have chosen (A). Anderson and Holt (1997) found that cascades are formed when the 
initial decisions coincide, and they concluded that following the established pattern in such 
cases is consistent with normative reasoning (Bayes’ rule), that is that beliefs are revised by 
optimal use of diagnostic information. However, they also found that in about half of the 
cases when a cascade was observed, participants’ choices were inconsistent with Bayes’ rule 
and were thus interpreted as irrational. 
 
In experiments demonstrating information cascade the price of a stock share does not change 
with demand. Avery and Zemsky (1998) argued that if stocks with market-determined prices 
are chosen, information cascades cannot start. Counter-arguments were presented by Chari 
and Koehe (2004) and Sgroi (2003). Doubts about rationality of information cascades are 
furthermore raised by Spiwoks, Bizer, and Hein (2008) who report that only 36% of the 
decisions made by the participants were consistent with Bayes’ rule and that only a minority 
of them was able to state a correct reason for their decisions. 
 
Herding in stock markets may be explained by psychological principles of social influence. 
Festinger’s (1954) theory of social comparison processes and the pioneering experiments by 
Sherif (1935) and Asch (1956) started a tradition of social-influence research. In this research 
it is presumed that people in many areas of social life are influenced by others when making 
decisions. Such social influence is normative or informative (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). In the 
former case the motive is to conform to others due to external social pressure or internalized 
norms, whereas in the latter case the motive is to acquire useful information from others. 
According to Shiller (2000) both types exist in stock markets, informative social influence 
because given the uncertainty investors face, they are likely to use many sources of 
information including information about others’ behavior, and normative social influence 
because investors frequently are agents investing money owned by others and therefore 
accountable to them. 
  
Several theories of social influence have been proposed. One is Moscovici’s (1985) theory 
positing that different cognitive and motivational processes account for majority and minority 
influences. Briefly, a majority is assumed to trigger a comparison process leading to people 
complying with the majority without thoroughly reflecting on its message. Since people are 
unwilling to be identified with deviant groups, minorities are instead assumed to trigger a 
validation process leading to that the minority members’ arguments are critically evaluated. 
Another reason for majority influences, consistent with that social influences are informative, 
is that people who are uncertain about how to act use a “consensus” heuristic implying that 
the majority is correct (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Martin, Gardikiotis, & Hewstone, 2002). 
Conversely, a minority would not be trusted since it cannot be correct if the majority is. The 
consensus heuristic is sensible but would lead to errors if over-generalized. A consequence is 
that herding is rational or irrational depending on the circumstances. An important factor is 
the ease with which accuracy of performance can be determined. In stock markets this is 
generally difficult (Taleb, 2004). 
 
Andersson (2009) and Andersson, Hedesström, and Gärling (2009) reported a series of 
experiments in which undergraduates were asked to make predictions of changes in fictitious 
stock prices that were both systematic and unsystematic. Consistent with the results of 
research on probabilistic inference (Cooksey, 1996), the influence on the predictions of the 
current stock price increased when the systematic component of the changes in stock prices 
increased. For instance, an opening price of a stock that correlated with the closing price the 
same day was frequently used to predict the latter. When others (ostensibly consisting of five 
other participants) made predictions of the stock price that were disclosed to the participants, 
their predictions had a large influence if they were a consistent majority (four of the others 
making correlated predictions), but not if they were a consistent minority (two of the others 
making correlated predictions). Whether the majority made accurate or random predictions 
did not change its influence. Yet, if the price varied systematically so that it could be utilized 
to predict the stock price, majority influences tended to be reduced. 
 
An implication is that in times of excessive uncertainty (high volatility of stock prices), the 
tendency to follow others would be the strongest. Trends of falling or rising prices are 
therefore likely to be boosted. This starts a vicious circle. The causes of herding are under 
such circumstances probably multiple and not easy to identify. Obviously, common 
knowledge must be discounted as a cause when uncertainty is excessive. A possibly dominant 
cause under these circumstances is to avoid becoming a sucker (Dawes, 1999). As Keynes 
(1936/1997) noted, worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for one’s reputation to fail 
conventionally than to succeed unconventionally. It is likewise argued that investors who herd 
are able to share the blame and hide in the herd when making unsuccessful investment 
decisions (Devenow & Welch, 1996). Along the same lines, Scharfstein and Stein (1990) 
proposed that an unprofitable investment harms a decision maker considerably less when 
others have made similar investments, which constitutes a reputational reason for investors to 
ignore private information in favour of trading with the herd. Parallel to this explanation is 
Palley’s (1995) argument that herding is based on the principle of “safety in numbers,” 
assuming that managers are individually risk averse, and that their reward is partly based on 
relative performance. 
 
Empirical results are consistent with the notion that concern about reputation causes herding. 
Thus, younger portfolio managers deviate less from consensus than their older colleagues, 
possibly because they have more at stake in terms of reputation as they face a longer working 
life ahead (Hong, Kubik, & Solomon, 2000). Experiments with professional stock analysts  
have also demonstrated reputational herding. In one study (Cote & Sanders, 1997) 
participants’ task was to predict future returns. After each prediction the average prediction 
was shown to the participants, giving them an opportunity to adjust their own predictions. The 
results showed that presenting the average prediction had a significant influence, and that the 
degree of influence was related to the participants’ perceptions of their own ability and 
motivation to create or maintain a good reputation. 
 
Investors in stock markets have been described as mindless sheep blindly following the 
herd, being frantic during market booms and terrified during market crashes (Shiller, 2000). 
Although the evidence from research on herding in stock markets hardly justifies the sheep 
metaphor, herding is likely to reinforce the cognitive biases and affective influences to which 
investors in stock markets are susceptible. In doing so herding will aggravate stock price 
volatility that de-stabilizes the market (Bikchandani & Sharma, 2000; Chari & Koebe, 2004). 
 
Summary, Conclusions, and Future Research Directions 
It is argued that social factors play an important role for booms-bubbles-busts cycles in 
stock markets. Specifically, indirect and direct social influences may reinforce stock 
investors’ cognitive biases, exaggerated by affective influences. A review of research 
primarily undertaken by financial economists analyzing market data documents the 
prevalence of herding in stock markets. Additional research is still needed to show that 
imitating others is a possible mediating mechanism. Theories of social influence proposed in 
psychology contribute by focusing on different processes accounting for the observation that 
majority has stronger influence than minorities. Other psychological research in psychology 
(e.g. Biel, Eek, Gärling, & Gustafsson, 2008) is consistent with that investors are concerned 
about their reputation and for this reason consider it to be in their interest to not make 
different decisions than a majority (which in this psychological research is referred to as 
“common fate”). The conclusion is warranted that psychological research is highly relevant 
and in the following paragraphs we highlight several directions that this research can take. 
 
In line with the notion of two different information-processing systems (such as heuristic 
and systematic) (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; but see recent criticism by 
Keren & Schul, 2009), it has been proposed that herding occurs as a result of either 
unconscious and instinctive responses or deliberate thoughts (Baddeley, 2010). Martin, 
Hewstone, and Martin (2008) take a different approach by considering that influences from 
majorities or minorities instigate different amounts of processing effort. In the research on 
stock price predictions by Andersson (2009) and Andersson et al. (2009), low processing 
effort is interpreted as heuristic processing and high processing effort as systematic 
processing. The different types of processing are primarily operationalized as the tendency to 
follow a majority herd making random predictions (heuristic processing) and as the tendency 
to use a processing strategy that improves performance (systematic processing) by taking 
accuracy into account. Future research needs to disentangle whether the different types of 
processing can be equated with different amounts of processing effort and whether this 
sometimes is due to deliberate meta-decisions (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993). These 
issues seem particularly important with regard to informational social influence. An example 
is when people after thorough elaboration evaluates the available information as incomplete 
and therefore decides to rely on a consensus heuristic. In this case the decision to use a 
heuristic is in fact the result of systematic processing. That fast decisions allowing less 
information processing are frequently required (in a stock market) is an additional factor to 
take into account. 
  
In line with the theoretical suggestions by Prechter and Parker (2007), empirical findings 
have underlined the role of heuristic processing in herding. As noted, Andersson (2009) 
investigated the prevalence of use of the “consensus” heuristic. Also, it was argued that not 
following a minority may actually result from a converse consensus heuristic (to not follow 
the minority because it is always wrong). Quiamzade and L’Huillier (2009) found that people 
herd with others who have made unexpected investments, believing that these others possess 
privileged information. This belief was found to be a more prevalent explanation for herding 
than information about whether the others held professional investment positions. Thus, by 
arguing that attribution of superior information relates to the perception of expertise, people 
herd due to the use of a “heuristic about competence”. Thus, there are several propositions 
about an association between herding and heuristic processing. A topic for future research is 
to specify which heuristics are used under which conditions. 
 
Even though it is known that people may herd for different reasons, previous research on 
does not distinguish among different types of social influences. For example, informational 
social influence may be connected to reputational concerns, which is more closely related to 
normative social influences that also exist in financial markets (Shiller, 2000). Additional 
research is needed in order to identify different determinants of herding for the understanding 
of investors’ investment decisions. A complication that must be taken into account is that is 
that several determinants are likely to co-exist.  
 
Neuroscience methods may turn out to be a useful alternative approach to distinguishing 
between processes underlying herding. Some empirical results support that a decision to 
follow the herd has shorter decision times (Baddeley, Pillas, Christopoulos, Schultz, & 
Tobler, 2007). This is interpreted as a connection between herding and an automated 
decision-making heuristic. The interpretation bears similarities to functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) evidence in Asch-type tasks (Berns, Chappelow, Zink, Pagnoni, 
Martin-Skurski, & Richards, 2005). If the processes underlying herding can be better 
understood by brain organization and function, such attempts should be strongly encouraged. 
 
It may finally be concluded that it is important to emphasize that in psychology the same 
sharp distinction is not made between “rational” and “irrational” herding in stock markets as 
in the economic research (Baddeley, 2010). Such a sharp distinction would leave a limited 
role for psychological explanations. Apparently, theories of social influence go beyond an 
account of herding as rational when it improves investment decisions and irrational when it 
biases investment decisions. An extended interdisciplinary approach to herding deepens the 
understanding by including interactions between different decision-making processes.  
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Figure 1. Possible psychological determinants of stock market booms, bubbles, and busts. 
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Figure 2. A categorization of social influence in stock markets. 
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